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COMMENTS

Doctors, Insurers, and the Antitrust Laws
The past decade has seen a dramatic change in the ways physicians are
compensated for the provision of medical services. For years, physicians
have been paid according to the discrete medical procedures they performed during treatment. This method of compensation, known as "fee-forservice," gave physicians an incentive for overtreating patients; the more
procedures they performed, the more compensation they received. In order
to eliminate the inflationary tendency of fee-for-service compensation, physicians are being placed at financial risk for the costs of medical care. This
change is taking place by expanding the unit of payment for health-care
services. For example, physicians are frequently reimbursed according to
the number of patients they treat. Under such a scheme, a health maintenance organization (HMO) might pay a physician a fixed amount per year
for each patient assigned to him. The physician receives the payment
whether or not the patients actually require his care. However, if the total
costs of treatment exceed the fixed compensation, the physician is forced to
incur a loss. Thus, the risks associated with insuring a patient's health care
may be shifted from the HMO to the physician himself. The goal of this
Comment is to examine whether physicians who are placed at risk in this
way deserve the limited antitrust exemption for the "business of insurance"
provided by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. This exemption has allowed the
insurance industry to engage in some restricted forms of concerted activity,
including the joint collection and processing of underwriting data. As physicians take on the role of insurers, they too should be afforded the opportunity to engage in similar, but still restricted, forms of collective activity in
order to assess the financial risks they face and the adequacy of the compensation they receive.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, physicians have been compensated for their services
on the basis of the particular medical procedures they perform during a
course of treatment.1 This system of compensation, known as "fee-forservice," relies on the patient's health insurer to reimburse either the
1. See Wilensky & Rossiter, Alternative Units of Paymentfor PhysicianServices: An Overview of
the Issues, 43 MED. CARE REV. 133, 134-37 (1986).
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physician or the patient for the services received.' Critics have charged,
however, that fee-for-service compensation has contributed to the rapid
escalation of health-care costs. 3 The accusation stems from the belief that
a physician who is paid according to discrete medical procedures has a
clear incentive to increase the quantity of services provided, especially
those that are more profitable.4 Thus, "to the extent that physicians act
as 'agents' for patients and can induce additional utilization of services,
fee-for-service reimbursement encourages higher costs." 5 In response to
the economic effects of fee-for-service compensation, progress has been
made toward the establishment of alternative methods of reimbursement
intended to create financial incentives for physicians to control utilization of health-care services and, thereby, contain health-care costs. A significant reform has taken place by altering the unit of payment for
physician services. Instead of compensating physicians according to the
performance of particular medical procedures, the brokers of health-care
services, such as the federal government, indemnity health insurers, prepaid health plans, and health maintenance organizations, 6 have begun to
2. Traditional fee-for-service compensation is being rapidly replaced by other forms of physician
reimbursement. It is estimated that by 1990, fee-for-service compensation will drop to about 5 percent of the non-government subsidized health-care market; it represented 72 percent of that market
in 1985. HOSPITALS, Apr. 5, 1988, at 50.
3. Wilensky & Rossiter, supra note 1, at 134-37.
4. Langwell & Nelson, Physician Payment Systems: A Review of History, Alternatives and Evidence, 43 MED. CARE REV. 5, 23 (1986). Though fee-for-service compensation is often criticized
due to its inflationary tendencies, it also provides certain benefits to both the physician and the
patient. For example, the physician is not placed at financial risk, and unlike many other forms of
alternative compensation, the patient can change providers easily and quickly in the midst of an
episode of illness Wilensky & Rossiter, supra note 1, at 137.
5. Id. at 23.
6. The last twenty years have seen a rapid evolution of various medical delivery systems within
the health-care industry. The innovations have also caused a proliferation of terminology, some of
which deserve at least a brief explanation here. Historically, the most common form of protection
against the financial consequences of an illness or accident has been indemnity health insurance,
from which patients receive cash reimbursement for the expenses incurred related to medical treatment. A. EASTON, THE DESIGN OF A HEALTH INSURANCE MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION 9
(1975). Prepaid health plans, on the other hand, represent an alternative to indemnity insurance by
contracting directly with physicians and hospitals for the provision of services. Id. at 23. Under a
prepaid plan, payments are made directly to the service provider instead of the patient. Id. The most
well-known prepaid plans include Blue Cross and Blue Shield. Id.
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) also contract directly with service providers, but provide various types of financial incentives for physicians to control the utilization of services in order
to contain costs. See H. LuFr, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE 2-7 (1981). Like a prepaid health plan, HMOs are subsidized by their subscribers, who
pay a fixed monthly or annual premium. Id. In a staff model HMO, for example, the organization
employs physicians who receive a fixed salary. Under such an arrangement, there is no longer the
incentive for physicians to take advantage of fee-for-service compensation, since the physician is not
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compensate providers according to broader units of payment.7
An example is the way in which hospitals and health care providers
are now compensated by the federal government for inpatient hospital
services under Medicare's prospective payment program. Prior to 1983,
Medicare reimbursed hospitals according to the reasonable costs incurred in providing services to Medicare beneficiaries. 8 As with fee-forservice compensation, this type of retrospective payment system created
an incentive for hospitals to increase the supply of services: "The more
they spent for Medicare allowable costs, the more they received." 9
Eventually, Congress responded by adopting a new method of reimbursing hospitals for Medicare-related costs, based on fixed rates representing the average.costs of treating a Medicare patient according to the
patient's diagnosis."0 Upon discharge from the hospital, patients are assigned to one of several hundred diagnosis-related .groups (DRG). Each
DRG represents a combination of various patient attributes, including

the patient's principal diagnosis, the presence of a complicating condition, patient age, sex, and discharge status." Additionally, the assigned
DRG may reflect the performance of a surgical procedure. Thus, for example, a hospital will receive a fixed payment for a patient assigned to
DRG 222, which is defined to encompass surgical knee procedures for

patients under seventy years of age who do not have a complicating medical condition.' 2 Importantly, if the hospital is able to treat the patient for
paid by the service. D. MACKLE & D. DECKER, GROUP AND IPA HMOs 109 (1981). In a group
model HMO, participating physicians set up a separate organizational entity that contracts with the
HMO to provide services. Id. at 110. Alternatively, HMOs may contract with independent providers
for the provision of services. The methods of compensation for physician group and independent
practitioners who participate in an HMO vary depending on the degree to which the plan seeks to
place the provider at financial risk for the provision of services. For example, providers may be paid
on a fee-for-service basis or according to some type of risk-based provider arrangement, such as a
capitation agreement. Id. at 165-66.
With the exception of staff model HMOs, in which the physician is an employee of the organization, physicians generally stand in the position of an independent contractor to the organization. It is
this type of relationship, involving physicians as independent contractors, that provides the backdrop for this Comment, since the collective organization of independent providers may give rise to
antitrust scrutiny.
7. Langwell & Nelson, supra note 4, at 5.
8. A. SPIEGEL, COST CONTAINMENT AND DRGs: A GUIDE TO PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT 4
(1986).
9. Id.
10. Id. DRG rates are also adjusted by a wage index for area differences in hospital wage levels
compared to the national average hospital wage level. Id. at 5.
11. D. SMITH & M. FOTTLER, PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT: MANAGING FOR OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 18 (1985).
12. A. SPEIGEL, supra note 8, at 14.
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less than the DRG payment amount, it can retain the savings and,
thereby, realize a profit; however, if the treatment costs more, the hospital must absorb the loss.
Thus, by expanding the unit of payment beyond discrete medical
procedures, Medicare's DRG-based reimbursement system is intended to
create incentives for physicians and hospitals to contain health-care costs
by placing them at financial risk for the excessive costs of their services.
Medicare's compensation scheme can be placed on a continuum of
reimbursement systems based on the relative aggregation of services, the
most disaggregate being compensation per discrete medical procedure
under the fee-for-service system.' 3 The aggregation of services increases
when the unit of payment is the DRG, which may encompass a varying
number of medical procedures, depending on the particular episode of
treatment. Moving along this continuum in the direction of increasing
aggregation, the costs per unit of payment become more difficult to predict. The provider incurs increased financial risk as the payment unit
encompasses a longer period of time and, consequently, a greater diversity and quantity of services. 4 At the same time, the provider also receives increased incentive to control utilization of services, since the
physician receives a fixed payment per unit and is, therefore, induced to
maximize profits by containing the utilization and costs of services.15
The economic implications of expanding the unit of payment is, perhaps, the most apparent in the case of capitated reimbursement. When
the unit of payment is capitation, a physician receives a fixed rate of payment for agreeing to provide services to an individual patient over a certain period of time, usually a year.' 6 Though compensation for services
can be adjusted to account for demographic characteristics, such as patient age and sex, 1 7 the physician may be placed at direct financial risk
for the costs of services exceeding the fixed capitated reimbursement rate.
The same type of arrangement can be modified so that the physician is
also responsible for the cost of specialist referrals and inpatient hospitalization, thereby placing the physician at risk for the entire cost of patient
care."8 Of course, the benefit to the purchaser of services from this type
13. Wilensky & Rossiter, supra note 1, at 133. Though the authors observe that there is a continuum of payment units in terms of aggregation of units and services, it is less clear that cost-savings
increase proportionate to the aggregation of services per unit. Id. at 148-53.
14. Langwell & Nelson, supra note 4, at 23.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 34-35.
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of risk-based provider contract is found in a predictable and fixed cost for
health services resulting from the shift in financial risk from the purchaser to the provider. 19 Thus, for example, a health maintenance organization (HMO) can fix a predictable capitation rate for each patient
assigned to a contracting physician, leaving the physician to assume the
financial risks that usually belong to the insurer. In turn, the HMO will
receive a fixed premium from its subscribers in excess of the capitation
rates paid to its physician, thereby generating a profit for the HMO.
Under such an arrangement, the usual purchaser of health-care services- standing between the patient and the physician- has shifted its
traditional role as an insurer onto the physician."z
One response by physicians to this and other types of alternative
delivery systems, and to the increasing emphasis on cost containment in
general, has taken the form of collective organization. Physicians' unions, for example, have been established as a way for independent providers to attain a position of strength in negotiating with third-party
payors. 21 The recourse to concerted action, however, has met with rigor-

ous scrutiny under federal antitrust legislation. After Goldfarb v. Virginia
19. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
20. In a recent federal district court decision involving the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Reazin v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Kan. 1986), the court offered a
concise overview of the present trends in the health-care industry that is worth quoting at length:
The distinction between health care providers and insurers is blurring with the rapid
development of "brokered" arrangements for the purchase and provision of health services. These brokered arrangements may be sponsored by hospitals, physicians, insurers,
or a combination of the three, and may be negotiated through a number of different
vehicles, including health maintenance organizations... or other direct contract agreements. Whatever their form, these brokered arrangements share three common elements: the sale of health benefits in a wholesale market to group purchasers attempting
to obtain health services for less than full retail price; a contractual arrangement between
providers and purchasers more narrowly restricting consumer choice to select provider
panel; and management systems designed to insure cost effective utilization of health
services.... The merger of health services and insurance goes beyond the development
of brokered arrangements. As a result of a growing market for integrated health care
delivery and financing systems, the health care product is being "repackaged" with hospitals and hospital companies integrating into health insurance functions, while insurance companies are developing networks of health care providers. Market forces
influencing this integration include: fixed price and capitation programs from government, business and insurance companies; payors assuming the role of purchasers, seeking a package of health services and financing; consumer awareness of, and increased
responsibility for, ever increasing portions of their health care bills resulting from increasing co-payments and deductibles; and competition and excess capacity leading to
provider and insurance company initiatives to improve market position.
21. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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2
State Bar,"
in which the Supreme Court rejected any "learned profession" exemption from antitrust prosecution under the Sherman Act, the
1970's and early 1980's witnessed a marked increase in antitrust litigation against members of the health care industry.2 3 This trend has left
some independent physicians in a position of diminished bargaining
power relative to the legal and administrative capacities of third-party
payors' 4 to establish the level of compensation for medical services. 25
The goal of this Comment is to suggest that health-care providers
who are placed at financial risk for the provision of medical services may
be entitled to the limited antitrust exemption that is available to the insurance industry through the McCarran-Ferguson Act (Act). 26 Though
physicians and other health-care providers"7 should not be given complete immunity from federal antitrust laws, they should be permitted to
engage in some restricted forms of concerted activity in return for bearing the economic risks traditionally borne by conventional insurers of
health-care services. As is made clear below, the Act's limited exemption
should be granted to providers only in those situations where their conduct satisfies the applicable requirements of the Act.

II.

PHYSICIAN ORGANIZATION AND THE ANTITRUST RESPONSE

Professional trade associations have traditionally played an important role in the health-care industry as a mechanism for self-regulation. 28
More recently, these organizations, together with broader based profes22. 421 U.S. 873 (1975).
23.

Kauper, Antitrust and the Professions:An Overview, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 163, 165 (1983).

24. The terms "third-party payor" are used throughout this Comment as a generic designation
for those entities, such as indemnity insurers, prepaid health plans, or HMOs, that are principally
responsible for the compensation of health-care providers. In those cases where the traditional insuring entity has shifted all or most of its financial risk to the health care providers, the same entity
serves primarily as a purchaser or broker of health services for those individuals (or their employers)
who pay premiums to the plan in return for comprehensive health care. See infra note 114. The
individual members of the plan are generally referred to as "subscribers." Thus, a typical third-party
payor serves as an intermediary between the paying subscribers and those medical professionals that
participate in the plan; in this capacity, the third-party payor negotiates for the purchase of health
care services and coordinates the financial and administrative resources that are needed to maintain
the plan. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 131, 207.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982).
27. The terms "provider" and "physician" are used interchangebly throughout this Comment
to refer to health-care providers in general, either as independent practitioners or provider groups,
which may take the form of partnerships, professional corporations, or joint ventures. Moreover,
entities such as hospitals, when placed at financial risk, may also be considered "providers" for
purposes of this Comment.
28. See generally J. BURROW, AMA: VOICE OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1963).
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sional unions,29 have begun a process of collectivization as a means to
protect private economic and professional interests. The perceived threat
comes from outside the medical profession and takes several forms:
health care providers are increasingly placed at financial risk for the efficient provision of medical services;3" compensation for services is sometimes linked to a provider's compliance with rigorous utilization and
quality assurance programs; 31 the presence of a competitive health-care
plan within a community can force a physician to choose between a reduction in fees if he joins the plan or a possible decrease in patient load if
he does not.3 2 Not surprisingly, in reaction to the combined emphasis on
enhanced competition and cost-containment, independent physicians
have resorted to various forms of collective activity. The antitrust response, however, has not been sympathetic.
Despite the complexity of antitrust law a brief, statutory review of
the relevant federal legislation is necessary to understand the potential
liability that health-care providers may incur as a result of certain collective activities. Generally, federal antitrust laws seek to prevent aggregations of economic power that stifle the opportunity for competition.3 3
This goal is accomplished through the enforcement of three pieces of
federal legislation: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
The Sherman Act 34 is considered the cornerstone of the antitrust
law. Section 1 succinctly declares: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States" is illegal. 35 The operative phrase-restraint of trade-has given rise to the basic tenet of antitrust law, known
as the rule of reason: "Only those restraints of trade which are unreason29. The Union of American Physicians and Dentists, for example, was established by doctors
and dentists to assist in negotiations between providers and HMOs. The union has locals in seventeen states and 40,000 members as of March 1987. HOSPITALS, Mar. 5, 1987, at 58.
30. See infra notes 102-119 and accompanying text.
31. For example, a physician who participates in a prepaid health plan may be required to
demonstrate the medical necessity of the services proposed or actually performed in order to receive
compensation. See D. COWEN, PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS: PLANNING, STRUCTURE,
AND ORGANIZATION 169-77 (1984).

32. Carlova, How PPOs Turn DoctorAgainst Doctor, MED. ECON., Sept. 19, 1983, at 86 (physician's perspective on the emergence of alternative delivery systems in the health-care marketplace
and their adverse effects on the medical environment).
33. See generally E. KINTER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER (1973) for an accessible overview of a
complicated topic.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
35. Id.
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able have been held to violate the law."' 36 With the exception of certain
activities presumed to be illegal, a defendait in an antitrust action has
the opportunity to show that the challenged activities are reasonable in
view of the pending business conditions and that they do not in fact substantially and adversely impair competition.3 7 To eliminate the need for
this inquiry in every instance of antitrust enforcement, however, the
courts have developed the rule that "there are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal" 38 regardless of the actual harm caused or the
defendant's excuse. Examples of per se violations include price-fixing
agreements, group boycotts, and agreements to divide markets.39 As
shown below, independent physicians who undertake concerted activity
in order to influence their compensation from third-party payors may be
subject to Sherman Act scrutiny under the rule of reason or the standard
of per se illegality, depending on the particular conduct.4"
Section two of the Sherman Act4 1 prohibits the monopolization or
attempted monopolization of markets. It is "primarily concerned with
the situation in which a single firm or corporation achieves or seeks to
achieve a position of such size and power that it is capable of restraining
trade by its own, unaided efforts."'4 2 As a general rule, monopoly power
has been defined as the ability to control prices or exclude competition
from markets,4 3 though federal courts have not established a definitive or
consistent means to establish when a firm possesses such power. 44 Section
two liability will arise when a firm engages in restraints of trade, such as
boycotts and tying arrangements, in order to obtain its monopoly
power.4 5 It has also been held to apply when a firm lawfully obtains its
monopoly power through normal, competitive means, and thereafter engages in trade restraints as a way to expand or maintain that power.46
The Clayton Act 47 was passed by Congress in order to close some of
36.

E. KINTER, supra note 33, at 17.

37. Id. at 20.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
E, KINTER, supra note 33, at 21.
See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
E. KINTER, supra note 33, at 101.
Id.
Id. at 101-04.
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106.
15 U.S.C. § 11 (1982).
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the gaps left open by the Sherman Act. The substantive offenses under
the Clayton Act have primarily to do with the sale of goods and commodities, corporate acquisitions, interlocking directorates, and price discrimination. As such, the Clayton Act is unlikely to have a significant
effect in the context of concerted action by the providers of health services.4 8 This type of activity more appropriately falls under the Sherman
Act's broad sweep.
Lastly, the Federal Trade Commission Act declares that "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices" are unlawful.49 This language encompasses
the same anticompetitive standards found in the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, but the FTC Act goes further in permitting the Federal Trade
Commission to "stop in their incipiency acts and practices, which, when
full blown, would violate" the Sherman and Clayton Acts.5" Thus, the
FTC Act is important from an enforcement perspective, because it gives
the FTC the capacity to police interstate commerce for anticompetitive
conduct. Moreover, the FTC Act established the Federal Trade Commission as an agency designed to protect the public from deceptive commercial practices and protect the competitive structure of the nation's
economy.5 1
Returning to the context of health care, the current trend of heightened antitrust scrutiny over concerted activity among professionals can
be traced at least as far back as Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,52 in which
the Supreme Court held that the use of agreed upon, recommended fee
schedules by bar association members was a violation of the Sherman
Act. Though Goldfarb was not the first case to apply antitrust standards
to professional activities,5 3 the Court's firm rejection of a "learned profession" exemption has "opened the door through which many have since
marched."5 4 That the Court's decision was part of a broader movement
to promote competition within the learned professions is supported, in
48. See M. THOMPSON, ANTITRUST AND THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER 12-14 (1979) (describing application of the Clayton Act in the health care context involving interlocking directorates and
officers).
49.

15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982).
KINTER, supra note 33, at 23.
51. Id. at 23.
52. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See also Clanton, The FTC and the Professions, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 209
(1983) (enforcement perspective on the application of federal antitrust law to the professions);
Kauper, Antitrust and the Professions:An Overview, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 163 (1983) (historical overview of trends in antitrust scrutiny of the professions).
53. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (considered the first
significant application of antitrust principles to health providers).
54. Kauper, supra note 23, at 164.

50. E.
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part, by the enactment of the Health Maintenance Organization Act"
just two years earlier. In passing the HMO Act, Congress sought to spur
economic efficiency within the health care industry by providing financial
support and federal guidelines for the creation of competitive health
56
maintenance organizations on a national basis.
After Goldfarb, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society5 7 confirmed that the health care industry would be treated as any other in the
eyes of federal antitrust law. Maricopa involved a non-profit corporation
composed of roughly 1,750 physicians engaged in private practice. The
organization was created in order to promote fee-for-service medicine
and to provide the community with an alternative to existing health insurance plans by establishing maximum fees for participating providers.
Because the providers themselves fixed the maximum fees payable by insurers, the arrangement was held to constitute a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.5" That the Court's ruling on such a complex issue was
made on a motion for summary judgment has been described as "troubling" and reminiscent of "times ... when antitrust cases were decided
more by reference to talismanic phrases than careful analysis." 59
The same criticism might not apply to the Court's approach in FTC
v. IndianaFederationof Dentists,6 0 in which it refused to apply the per se
rule in the context of a group boycott. Like Maricopa, the case is indicative of the response by medical professionals to cost-containment efforts
imposed by third-party payors. Specifically, dental health insurers had
implemented a cost-containment program whereby the insurer evaluated
a provider's services to determine the necessity of treatment. As part of
the program, insurers frequently requested dentists to submit, along with
insurance claim forms, any dental x-rays that had been taken in the
course of treatment. The insurer used the x-rays and other medical information as a basis for approving or disapproving a patient's insurance
claim. In response, the Indiana Federation of Dentists (IFD), comprising
55. 87 Stat. 914 (1973) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1987)).
56. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, P.L. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (1973) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1982), delineates the requirements an HMO must meet to become federally

qualified according to organizational structure, health care benefits, and the manner of conducting
business. Though federal qualification is not intended to represent that the HMO is financially viable, qualification is necessary to receive federal subsidies under the act and also serves as a means to
demonstrate publicly that the HMO has complied with a federally uniform standard.
57. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
58. Id. at 341.
59. Sims, Maricopa: Are the ProfessionsDifferent?, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 177, 183 (1983).

60.

106 S.Ct. 2009 (1986).
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approximately eighty-five percent of the practicing dentists in the state,
enlisted member dentists to pledge not to submit x-rays as requested.
Though the Court conceded that the IFD's dealings with the insurers resembled a group boycott, it did not apply the traditional rule that
such activities are per se illegal under the Sherman Act.6 1 Though this
may be considered a step in the direction of leniency for the health care
industry, the Court still sustained the FTC's finding that the Federation's
policy of withholding x-rays was an unreasonable restraint of trade and,
therefore, in violation of the Sherman Act.62
Similarly, health-care providers will not be allowed to boycott competitors who agree to participate in lower cost health-service agencies,
such as HMOs. This was made clear in Feminist Women's Health Center
v. Mohmmad,63 in which a group of physicians undertook concerted action to interfere with the successful operation of a local abortion clinic.
In response to the clinic's advertised price for first trimester abortions at
less than half of that charged by area physicians, a group of local doctors
attempted to persuade other physicians from associating with the clinic.
The conduct was held to be a per se violation under the Sherman Act.'
The above cases are representative of how federal antitrust legislation has been employed to prevent collective activity on the behalf of
medical professionals in response to cost-containment mechanisms and
the promotion of competition within the health-care industry. There are
however, some forms of concerted activity among health-care professionals that are not subject to antitrust scrutiny.
In Wilk v. American Medical Association, for example, the court of
appeals held that it was "free to modify the rule of reason test in a case
involving a certain kind of question of ethics for the medical profession. '"65 Specifically, the court held that a group of defendants would be
able to introduce evidence that their collective activity was motivated by
a concern for the health and lives of the patients for whom they had
accepted responsibility.6 6 An application of the "patient care motive,"
however, will not be casually approved. The rule "should impose a heavy
burden on those who would justify conduct having a significant anticompetitive effect." 67
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 2018.
Id. at 2018-21.
Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976).

64. Id. at 1264-67.
65.
66.
67.

719 F.2d 207, 226 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id.
Id. at 227.
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Concerted activity is also immune from antitrust scrutiny if it is
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy." 6 For
example, a court of appeals has held that a hospital staff's review of a
physician's medical procedures as required by Indiana law will not give
rise to an antitrust violation.6 9
Lastly, a group of medical providers may have a defense from antitrust enforcement if it can be shown that the local nature and effect of
their conduct is not a sufficient influence on interstate commerce to fall
within federal antitrust legislation.7 ° However, the availability of this defense has been largely eroded by the Supreme Court's decision in Hospital Building Company v. Rex Hospital Trustees7 that the purchase of
medical supplies from out of state will satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act.
There are, however, some instances where antitrust enforcement is
compatible with the medical profession's process of self-regulation. The
following are examples of collective activity by professional trade associations that will not give rise to infraction:
1. disciplining or expelling members of an association for incompetence or
dishonesty, or because the member engaged in false or deceptive
advertising;72
2. sponsoring or participating in peer review of fees and the quality of care
provided by73 professionals when the risk of anticompetitive conduct is
minimized;
3. sponsoring or participating in the accreditation of professional schools
and certification programs whereby a professional association certifies
that its members are trained and qualified in particular areas of
specialization. 74
Additionally, a group of independent physicians other than a trade
association may participate in some forms of collective activity provided
it does not have an anticompetitive effect. The following are examples of
how a union of independent physicians may conduct itself.
1. Representatives for a union can hold meetings with third-party payors
in order to present the union members' viewpoints, suggest options and
68. California Retail Liquor Dealer's Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
69. Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (1984).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1959).
71. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
72. Jacobs, Competition in Health Care Markets: Avoiding the Antitrust Pitfalls, 17 TOLEDO
L.REv. 839, 840 (1987). See also THoMPSON, supra note 48, at 107-47 for a comprehensive discussion of the role of trade associations and possible antitrust violations.
73. Jacobs, supra note 72, at 840.
74. Id.

1988/89]

ANTITRUST EXEMPTION

solutions with regard to the relationship between the parties, so long as
the union members do not form an agreement among themselves concerning their conduct with the payor.75

2. The union can disseminate information, such as results of studies having to do with third-party payors in76order to help members make informed, but independent, decisions.
3. Union members can engage in non-deceptive publicity and advertising
in order to express individual and joint physician concerns to the
77
public.

4. Union members can meet to discuss common
problems so long as there
78
is no conspiracy or agreement reached.
When physicians are placed at financial risk for the provision of
medical services, these types of collective activity may not go far enough
to protect providers against economic loss, especially during negotiations
with a third-party payor that possesses the financial and administrative
resources to predict expected costs more accurately than the physician.
Moreover, the types of self-regulation found within professional trade associations are not intended to protect the economic interests of physicians as they enter into bargaining with the purchasers of medical
services.79
As I hope to show below, those physicians who are placed at financial risk for the provision of medical services may be able to take advantage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act as a means to pursue certain
restrictive forms of collective activity, which go beyond those listed
above, for the purpose of assessing financial risk and determining appropriate compensation rates for risk-based provider arrangements. The Act
is not intended to provide a blanket exemption from anticompetitive conduct, and it is not the goal of this Comment to suggest that medical providers should be entirely immune from antitrust legislation. However, as
physicians incur the financial risks associated with the business of insurance, they should be granted the same limited antitrust exemption that is
presently afforded the insurance industry under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.
75. Paul, Physicians Unions and the Antitrust Laws, 31 BOSTON BAR. J. 17, 19 (1987).
76. Id.
77. Id.

78. Id.
79. Adding to the potential disparity in the bargaining power is the fact that third-party payors
find themselves in a position of strength due to the growing oversupply of providers. Powers, Allocation of Risk in Managed Health Care, in MANAGED HEALTH CARE: LEGAL AND OPERATIONS
ISSUES FACING PROVIDERS, INSURERS, AND EMPLOYEES 279, 292 (M. Combe ed. 1986).
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THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT: HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Any meaningful discussion of the McCarran-Ferguson Act requires
some familiarity with the reasons for its enactment.
For over seventy-five years prior to 1945, when the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed, state insurance departments exercised their authority over the insurance industry without federal oversight or
intervention.8 0 As early as 1868, the Supreme Court's dictum that "issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce"' I led many to
conclude that the federal government was incapable of intervention, since
its authority was thus proscribed under the commerce clause.
In 1944, however, the Supreme Court shocked the industry with its
landmark decision of United States v. South-Eastern UnderwritersAssociation (S.E. UA.), 82 in which it held that the insurance industry was subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause. More importantly,
the Court held that the same industry was subject to federal antitrust
law, specifically, the Sherman Act.83
The congressional response to the S.E. UA. decision was influenced
by three concerns of the insurance industry as it reacted to the ruling.
First, there was the immediate threat of criminal prosecution felt by
those who had for years assumed that their industry was immune from
antitrust enforcement.8 4 Second, it was feared that state tax and regulatory schemes would be found unconstitutional under the commerce
clause.8 And, third, it was believed that the Court's decision would now
make possible a federal takeover of state insurance regulation under the
activist Roosevelt administration.8 6 The latter concern has been described as "one of the important issues addressed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act." 87
Though Congress did not accede to proposals for granting the industry complete antitrust immunity, 8 8 the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as
enacted, embodied a compromise between the enforcement of federal an80. Weller, The McCarran-FergusonAct's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History, and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 589.
81. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
82. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
83. Id. at 553-62.
84. Weller, supra note 80, at 90.
85. Id. at 91.
86. Id. at 92.
87. Id. at 92-93.
88. The complete-exemption bills were sponsored by the stock insurance industry, which was
the most directly affected by the Supreme Court's ruling in S.E.U.A. Weller, supra note 80, at 592.
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titrust law and the preservation of state regulation. 9 Specifically, the Act
provides that "the Sherman Act... the Clayton Act ...and. . . the
Federal Trade Commission Act ...shall be applicable to the business of
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by state
law." 90 The Act's language reflects the congressional belief that the states
were better equipped to regulate the insurance business because of their
familiarity with the local industry and because of their prior experience
in regulating the same. 91
Additionally, the statute's exemption is further limited insofar as it
is "inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, intimidate, or act of
boycott, coercion, or intimidating."9 2 This provision is intended to sustain an application of the antitrust laws in those circumstances where
insurers exceed "the realm of state-supervised cooperative action." 93
Thus, the Act is not designed to overrule entirely the Court's decision in S.E.UA., which made the insurance industry subject to antitrust
scrutiny. Rather, the congressional response to S.E. U.A. represents an
accommodation of state and federal interests that is indicative of the federalist process.
IV. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT AS APPLIED TO RISK-BASED
PROVIDER ARRANGEMENTS

A. Requirement for an Application of the Exemption
An application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust exemption turns on three separate inquiries:
1. whether the challenged activity is part of the "business of insurance";
2. whether the activity is regulated by state law; and
3. whether the activity constitutes
an agreement or act of boycott, coer94
cion, or intimidation.
The discussion below is intended to test the viability of the Act's
limited antitrust exemption in the context of health-care providers who
are placed at financial risk for the provision of medical services. I will
89. This compromise was motivated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
which was concerned more with the ability of states to sustain their regulatory authority over the
insurance industry and less with a complete exemption from federal antitrust laws. Id. at 93.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982).
91. Weller, supra note 80, at 598.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1982).

93. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Barry, 430 U.S. 531 (1978).
94. See, eg., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pirero, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
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address separately each of the statute's three principal elements, as described above.
B.

The "Business of Insurance"

The Supreme Court has only twice ruled on what constitutes the
"business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act in the context of antitrust enforcement. 95 Consequently, the lack of statutory definition combined with numerous lower court decisions makes it difficult
to apply the Act's exemption with any precision. Still, there is adequate
authority, both legislative and judicial, to suggest that providers who are
placed at financial risk are engaged in the "business of insurance."
1. Risk-Spreading. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Group Life
and Health Insurance v. Royal Drug96 is especially apposite, despite the
Court's ruling against exemption in the case. Even in denying protection
under the, Act the case sheds important light on the statute's intended
purpose.
The plaintiffs in Royal Drug brought an action against Blue Shield
of Texas and three pharmacies with which Blue Shield had contracted
under its "Pharmacy Agreement." The agreement, whicht was offered on
a state-wide basis, provided that Blue Shield would reimburse the acquisition cost for each prescription filled for its policyholders. The pharmacy
would retain a $2.00 fee paid by the policyholder upon purchase of the
drugs. The plaintiffs alleged that this arrangement constituted a violation
of the Sherman Act because the defendants allegedly agreed upon and
fixed the price of the drugs, thereby inducing Blue Shield's policyholders
to boycott those pharmacies that had not entered into a similar
97
agreement.
The Court began its discussion by distinguishing the "business of
insurance," which is protected by the Act, from the "business of insurers," which is not: "Insurance companies may do many things which are
subject to paramount federal regulation; only when they are engaged in
the 'business of insurance' does the statute apply." 98 Going further, the
95. Group Life and Health Ins. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205 (1979); Union Labor Life Ins. Co.
v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
96. 440 U.S. 205 (1979). See generally Note, The Business ofInsurance:Exemption, Exemption,
Who Has the Antitrust Exemption, 17 PAC. L.J. 261 (1985); Note, Royal Drug: Bad Medicine for the
InsuranceIndustry, 16 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 741 (1980); Note, The Definition of "Business of ln.
surance" Under the McCarran-FergusonAct After Royal Drug, 80 COLUM. L.REV. 1475 (1980).
97. 440 U.S. at 207.
98. Id. at 211 (quoting SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1972)).
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Court explained that the "business of insurance" necessarily entails the
spreading and underwriting of risks.99 The pharmacy agreements in
question, however, did not satisfy this requirement, since they were
"merely arrangements for the purchase of goods and services by Blue
' ° Thus, the contracts were "legally indistinguishable from
Shield. '""
countless other business arrangements that may be made by insurance
companies to keep their costs low and thereby lower the level of premiums charged to their policyholders." 10 1
At first, this treatment of an interindustry agreement between an
insurer and its providers would appear to preclude an application of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act to similar arrangements between third party
payors and health-care professionals. There are, however, important exceptions that arise in the case of physicians who incur the financial risks
that have been traditionally borne by indemnity insurers or prepaid
health plans, such as Blue Shield in the Royal Drug case. With this in
mind, the Court's emphasis on risk-spreading is particularly appropriate
for those arrangements in which the purchaser of health services, such as
an HMO, is able to transfer some or all of its risk to the provider.
It is necessary at this point to examine risk-based provider arrangements in further detail in order to assess the Act's application to riskspreading activities involving health-care providers.
In the most general terms, the risk-spreading role of physicians is
created by expanding the unit of payment for a provider's services beyond the discrete medical procedure, which traditionally has served as
the basis for compensation under the fee-for-service system.10 2 The expansion of the payment unit can take several forms, depending on the
extent to which the unit represents anticipated costs over a greater or
lesser period of time. As discussed in Section I above, the alternatives can
be placed on a continuum from payment for a pai-ticular procedure (feefor-service) to a rate of compensation based on demographically determined patient attributes (capitation). The following are considered alter99. Id. at 211-12. The Court sheds additional light on its understanding of risk spreading with
the following quote: "It is characteristic of insurance that a number of risks are accepted, some of
which involve losses, and that such losses are spread over all of the risks at a slight fraction of the
possible liability upon it." Id. (quoting 1 G. COUcH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1:3 (2d ed.
1959).
100. Id. at 214.
101. Id.
102. See supranote I and accompanying text. See generally Feigenbaum,Risk Bearingin Health
Finance, in HEATLH CARE AND ITS COSTS 105 (C. Schramm ed. 1987).
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native payment units for physician compensation, ordered from discrete
to less discrete payment units:
1. medical procedure (fee-for-service),
2. medical case (e.g., office visit or hospital admission),
3. episode of illness (e.g., diagnosis related groups),
4. capitation for ambulatory services only,
5. capitation for all health services, including referrals and inpatient

hospitalization. 103
The last and most extreme example from this list provides the clearest illustration of how the business of insurance can be combined with
the practice of medicine. Under a fully capitated delivery system, physicians receive a periodic payment (usually monthly) for treating a fixed
number of patients for a specified period, usually one year.' 4 Generally,
the physician receives the payment whether or not the patients actually
require medical attention.l°S The arrangement frequently involves a contractual relationship between the physician, serving as a independent
contractor, and a third-party purchaser of health services, such as an
HMO. In turn, the payor is subsidized by its subscribers, their employers, or both, who pay a fixed monthly premium directly to the thirdparty payor. The payor then contracts with physicians, also at fixed rates,
0 6
and makes the participating physicians available to the subscriber.1
Generally, this type of plan provides comprehensive health care without
the deductible payments that are frequently associated with indemnity or
pre-paid health insurers. 0 7 Under a fully capitated model, the fixed payment made to a participating physician is intended to cover the entire
cost of medical treatment for each patient, including referrals to specialists and even, in some circumstances, inpatient hospitalization. 08 Additionally, the physician may be placed in the role of a "gate-keeper,"
making him a guardian of the patient's health and giving him the responsibility to control the amount of care that his assigned patients receive. 109
The gate-keeper function creates an incentive for the physician to prevent
needless and costly hospitalization or referrals to specialists, since she
will incur the costs for such, making her practice less profitable. Thus, if
103. Langwell & Nelson, supra note 4, at 22-23.
104. D. MACKIE & D. DECKER, GROUP AND IPA HMOs 166 (1981).
105. See infra note 111.
106. D. MACKIE & D. DECKER, supra note 104, at 154.
107. Langwell & Nelson, supra note 4, at 22-23.
108. See Wilensky & Rossiter, supra note 1, at 144-48.
109. See Paxton, Are Gatekeepers Good for Medicine?, MED. ECON., Dec. 22, 1986, at 60. In
1984, there was a 117 percent increase in the number of independent provider associations, which
frequently employ the gate-keeper model. Id. at 62.
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the physician on average is able to control the costs of care for the patients assigned to her, she will realize a profit from the balance of the
capitation fee paid to her by the third party payor. However, if costs
exceed revenue, the physician suffers a financial loss.
The compensation paid to physicians under a capitated plan is determined by actuarial projections of how much it will cost on average to
treat a specified number of patients, taking into consideration certain
demographic features, such as patient age and sex. ° The insuring function of the capitated physician is underscored by the fact that payments
to the physician are made whether or not the assigned patients use her
services. 1 I1
Some of the financial risk on a provider under this sort of reimbursement system might be alleviated if the provider belongs to a group of
physicians who distribute the risk among its members. 12 For example, a
group of physicians that contracts as a single entity with an HMO will be
in a less vulnerable position if they are able to spread any financial loss
among themselves. A single, costly episode, which might ruin an independently capitated physician, may be better absorbed by several practitioners who can offset the financial loss among some of their members
with the profits of others. Nevertheless, the risk remains with the physicians, so that the group, instead of a single provider, takes on the insur13
ing function."
Under a fully capitated model, in which the physicians bear the entire costs of medical treatment, the insuring function is shifted entirely
from the traditional insuring entity to the health-care providers:
The primary benefit of a capitation system to the HMO is that the risk of
providing health services is no longer borne by the HMO. Instead, the risk
is shifted directly to the hospital and physicians. As a result, the primary
role of a capitated HMO is no longer that of insurer. This role has changed
to that of a non-risk bearing intermediary that serves as a broker between
110. Langwell & Nelson, supra note 4, at 23.
111. Capitation arrangements "share the common characteristics that there is little or no direct
relationship between the compensation received by the physician and the quantity of services which
he renders." A. EASTON, supra note 6, at 39.
112. Langwell & Nelson, supra note 4, at 37-38. See also A. EASTON, supra note 6, at 37. Group
practice organizations vary widely in size and type of practice. Id. at 37.
113. A. EASTON, supranote 6, at 39. Though a group of physicians may possess the administrative and financial resources to better determine adequate compensation for risk-based provider arrangements, the consolidation of physicians as a partnership or professional corporation should not
itself prevent an application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See infra note 136.
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Though the third-party payor, or "broker" in the above quotation, is not
without some administrative responsibilities, 15 the "business of insurance" rests entirely with the health-care providers.
The financial risk that is borne by the fully capitated physician, as
described above, can be diminished by narrowing the unit of compensation. For example, the physician may bear the risk of primary care services only. 16 Under such a plan, the primary care provider accepts fixed
payments per patient only for those ambulatory services he actually provides, while the risks associated with referrals to specialists and inpatient
hospitalization are borne by the other providers during the course of
treatment or by the third-party payor. Such an arrangement entails fewer
risks for the physician, since the high cost of referrals and hospitalization
fall elsewhere. The result is that the insuring function for all services
provided under the plan may be distributed among several entities.
Moving further in the direction of more discrete and, therefore, less
risky payment units, the physician may be reimbursed based on any of
the following: (1) the patient's specific illness, (2) general categories of
medical treatment (such as an office visit or hospital admission), or (3) a
particular medical procedure. As the unit of payment is made to encompass fewer medical procedures and a shorter period of time, it becomes
easier to predict actual costs associated with each unit of service. Conse7
quently, the financial risk diminishes as the payment unit gets smaller."t
The physician's incentive to contain medical costs, however, also decreases as the unit is made more concise. For example, a physician who is
paid for each medical procedure he performs will have an incentive to
over-treat his patients; whereas, the fully capitated provider seeks to limit
treatment to those services actually required, since she bears the financial
risk for any costs in excess of the fixed payment she receives from the
third-party payor.I t ' The rapid increase in the number of HMO's, which
114.

Kazahaya, Risky Business: The Risk-Based, Risk-Sharing CapitatedHMO, HEALTH CARE

FINANCE REV., Aug. 20, 1986, at 20.

115. These include administrative work relating to the processing of enrollee applications, development of operational policies and procedures, development of management information systems,
and management and distribution of capitation fees. Id. at 70.
116. Primary care services generally encompass those basic medical services that a patient receives during his initial contact with the medical system for an injury or illness and includes the
coordination of subsequent medical treatment, such as referrals to specialists or inpatient hospitalization. See P. LEE, L. LEROY, J. STALCUP & J. BECK, PRIMARY CARE IN A SPECIALIZED WORLD

3, 5 (1976).
117. See Wilensky & Rossiter, supra note 1, at 149.
118. See Langwell & Nelson, supra note 4, at 23.
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frequently use some form of capitation arrangement, suggests that capitation reimbursement will become common place among health-care delivery systems.' 1 9
With this understanding of how the practice of medicine and the
business of insurance are being merged, we can now return to the
Supreme Court's emphasis on risk-spreading as an essential element of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust exemption.
Royal Drug stands for the proposition that the incidental commercial activities of the insurance industry are not entitled to antitrust immunity because they do not properly belong to the "business of
insurance." The purchase of goods and services by the insurer are distinct from the risk-spreading that takes place between it and its insureds.
But what about those circumstances in which the insuring function is
transferred, in whole or in substantial part, to the providers of medical
services? For the reasons discussed below, the Act's antitrust exemption
should rest with those whom the Act was intended to protect. Where
physicians are, in fact, engaged in the "business of insurance," then the
exemption should reside with them.
This argument finds support in the Court's own understanding of
why the business of insurance has been afforded an exemption from the
federal antitrust laws. Pointing to the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Court in Royal Drug observed:
Because the widespread view that it is very difficult to underwrite risks in
an informed and responsible way without intra-industry cooperation, the
primary concern of both representatives of the insurance industry and the
Congress was
that cooperative ratemaking efforts be exempt from the anti120
trust laws.
Thus, passage of the Act was motivated, in part, by a concern for those
who would suffer financial loss or demise due to inaccurate underwriting.1 21 In particular, the legislative history reflects a concern for those
insurers that may not possess the resources required for accurate underwriting. The Court in Royal Drug relied on a report to the Senate Committee submitted by the National Association of Insurance Comm119. According to a recent HMO census report, 27.7 million people, or approximately 13 percent of the U.S. population, are enrolled in 654 HMO's. The HMO industry experienced a growth
rate of 20 percent in enrollment and 50 percent in the number of new plans from 1981 to 1985.
INTERSTUDY, NATIONAL HMO CENSUS REPORT

(1986).

120. 440 U.S. at 221.
121. See J. DAY, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 7, 8 (1970)
("Unbridled competition was viewed as a cause of depressed rates and insurance company
failures.").
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issioners (NAIC), which was influential in shaping the Act's final ver-

sion. The report emphasized that "smaller enterprises and insurers [may
be] unable to underwrite risks accurately" and that the prohibition of
"combined efforts for statistical and ratemaking purposes would be a
backward step in the development of a progressive business." '2 2 The

NAIC's concern that some insurers may be unable to properly underwrite risks is, perhaps, no longer justified; in fact, some critics argue that
the Act is obsolete and should be repealed due to its anticompetitive effects.123 The NAIC's rationale for cooperative ratemaking activities,
however, finds a new and valuable application to the "progressive busi-

ness" of modern health-care delivery, in which small enterprises-sometimes individual physicians-are assuming the unfamiliar role of
insurers, and at times, suffering the financial consequences that motivated the NAIC's call for cooperative underwriting and ratemaking
activities. 124
Moreover, the methods used to establish capitation rates for healthcare providers are very similar to the methods that insurance companies

have used to set premiums.25 In both cases, the collection and processing of data is essential to an accurate assessment of future costs and appropriate pricing. Under the Act, insurance companies are permitted to
122. 440 U.S. at 221-22.
123. See, e.g., Angoff, InsuranceAgainst Competition:How the McCarran-FergusonAct Raises
Prices andProfits in the Property-CasualtyInsuranceIndustry, 5 YALE J.ON REG. 397 (1988) (arguing that collusive conduct protected by Act caused insurance crisis of 1985-86 and allowed for supracompetitive profitability of general liability and medical malpractice insurers); Antitrust Exemptions
and Immunities:Insurance,48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1245, 1262-1280 (1979) [hereinafter Exemptions and
Immunities] (essay from collection of materials submitted to the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures) (discussion of proposed reforms of McCarran-Ferguson
Act). The proposed repeal or amendment of the Act has made it as far as Congress. See, e.g., S. 80,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (introduced by Sen. Metzenbaum) (would repeal Act in its entirety and
grant two year moratorium on civil antitrust litigation against insurers); H.R. 2727, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., (1987) (introduced by Rep. Edwards) (would eliminate antitrust exemption for insurance industry); H.R. 3749, 100th Cong., IstSess., (1987) (introduced by Rep. LaFalce) (would amend Act
to limit antitrust exemption for insurance industry to certain specified activities).
124. See, e.g., Brown, Why an HMO and its FoundingDoctors are Facing Off in Court, MED.
EcoN., Dec. 8, 1986, at 64 (describing financial loss suffered by capitated physicians as a result of
catastrophic clinical event); Cook & Rodnick, Evaluating HMO/IPA Contractsfor Family Physicians: One Group's Experience, 26 FAMILY PRACTICE 325 (1988) (fifteen physician primary care
group experienced $43,297 loss under capitation arrangement with HMO).
125. Anderson, Steinberg, Holloway & Cantor, Paying HMO Care:Issues and Options in Setting
Capitation Rates, 64 MILBANK Q. 548, 555 (1986). The authors explain that insurance companies
rely on two methods to set premiums-manual rating and experience rating:
Manual rating uses demographic and other data to calculate payment rates for different classes of enrollees. Published tables provide actuarial adjustments for factors such
as age, sex, geographic location, size of insurance plan, etc. Manual rating is generally
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engage in cooperative pooling of information as a means to facilitate the
underwriting of risks.12 6 Property-liability insurers also participate in
rate bureaus that go beyond the collection of data in publishing "bureau
rates" based on the information provided by their members.127 Though
the possible anticompetitive effects of rate bureaus have not gone unnoticed,' 2 8 the Act's limited antitrust exemption, nevertheless, condones
this type of concerted activity. 129 Until the Act is repealed or amended to
restrict collective activity by insurers, health-care providers who are

placed at a financial risk should be accorded the same exemption in order
that they too may be able to engage in the collection and processing of
data used to establish capitation rates. Without this ability, it is likely
that capitation rates will continue to be set by third-party payors who
possess the resources necessary for the task. 130 Consequently, risk-based

providers who do not by themselves have the financial and administrative
resources for determining adequate captitation rates will remain in a poused by insurance companies only for small groups or new clients for whom experience
rating is not feasible.
Experience rating, in contrast, relies on other factors to determine premium rates.
These include the actual historical health-care costs of a specific group of individuals, as
well as a projection of the rate of inflation, an allowance for profits and reserves... and
adjustments for changes in the pool of eligible individuals and the level of coverage from
year to year. Experience-rating systems are based upon group rather than individual
enrollee experience ....
Capitation prices are established using modified versions of these two premium-setting methodologies.
Id. See also D. MACKIE & D. DECKER, supra note 104, at 129-49 (methods of premium determination for HMOs).
126. See Exemptions and Immunities, supranote 123, at 1249. Though the collection and analysis of historical data may not give rise to antitrust violations, the present status of antitrust law "does
not permit the collection or trending of prospective costs, which is considered essential to the insurance rate-making process." Seiler, Should Congress Repeal McCarran-Ferguson?,I ANTITRUST 31,
32 (Summer 1987) (summarizing testimony of Mark Homing before Senate hearings on S. 80).
127. Exemptions and Immunities, supra note 123, at 1250.
128. See, e.g., Angoff, supra note 123, at 404-15.
129. See, e.g., Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971) (concerted pricing activity by 129 insurance companies belonging to rating bureau exempted from antitrust laws under McCarran-Ferguson Act); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F.
Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (cooperative rate setting permitted under Act); Fleming v. Travelers
Indemnity Co., 324 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Mass. 1971) (defendant's participation in rating board permitted under Act).
130. In the case of the insurance industry, competition from smaller insurers is made possible by
cooperative rate-making activity because smaller enterprises "have neither the resources nor the
underlying credible data to make their own rates." Seiler, supra note 126, at 32. Analogously, independent providers or small physician groups that enter into capitation agreements are also likely
lack the necessary resources for setting appropriate capitation rates.
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sition of diminished bargaining strength when negotiating rates.13 1
Also under the rubric of risk-spreading, we should consider what
would happen to the Act's antitrust exemption if it were not applied to
those physicians who take on the role of insurers. Reazin v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc.132 provides a clue. The defendant in Reazin
provided private health-care financing through its subsidiary, HMO
Kansas. The defendant HMO employed a capitation reimbursement system in which participating physicians were paid a specified amount for
each member choosing that physician as his or her primary care provider. A portion of this fee was paid into a capitation fund to cover the
costs of inpatient hospitalization and referrals to specialists. At the end of
each year, the capitation fund was distributed to participating physicians
on a pro rata share based on the number of patients treated. The defendant sought the protection of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in an antitrust
action against it, arguing that its role as a third-party payor belonged to
the "business of insurance" under the Act. The court conceded that "the
formerly distinct boundaries among hospitals, physicians, and insurers
are 'blurring' with the emergence of. . . new financing arrangements
attempting to obtain health services for less than full retail price .... 1,133
Still, the exemption was denied. The court reasoned that companies
should not be allowed to take advantage of the Act's exemption by "simply diversifying into areas not traditionally considered to be the 'business
of insurance.' "134 This argument is unpersuasive because it assumes that
courts will be unable to distinguish risk-spreading activities from other,
general commercial arrangements. The Supreme Court's holding in
Royal Drug is intended to make possible this very distinction. Whatever
the merits of the court's reasoning, the result in Reazin is at least consistent with the Supreme Court's emphasis on risk-spreading as an integral
part of the business of insurance. From the facts presented, it appears
that the capitation system at issue in Reazin would have transferred a
substantial portion of the financial risk from the defendant HMO to the
physicians who participated in the plan. For this reason, and not those
131. See, e.g., Managed Care: Whoever has the Data Wins the Game, HOSPITALS, Apr. 5, 1988,
at 51. The executive director of Central Health Services, a provider group with 140 affiliated physicians, observed that the organization has no way of knowing whether the data provided by insurers
is complete or accurate. Id. at 51. In response, a national managed care practice director with Price
Waterhouse stated, "The HMO is holding all the cards that way. It's not a smart way to do business." Id.
132. 663 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Kan. 1987).
133. Id. at 1403.
134. Id.
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offered by the court, the defendants should not have received antitrust
immunity under the Act.
For the purpose of our own analysis, Reazin provides at least tentative support for the conclusion that private health-care financing will not
be recognized as the business of insurance.1 35 If, in turn, federal courts
refuse to grant the exemption to physicians who participate in similar
plans, then they will have, in effect, achieved a partial repeal of the Act.
In a capitated reimbursement plan, such as that discussed in Reazin, the
insuring function does not disappear. It may be transferred in whole or in
part to the participating physicians, but the risk remains. Consequently,
if courts are not careful in discerning which party deserves the Act's exemption, they may end up eliminating it entirely by refusing to grant it to
anyone. This is not to deny that there may be cases in which the insuring
function is distributed among the parties, so that neither the participating
physicians nor the third-party payor bears a substantial portion of the
total risk. 136 Still, in those cases in which the providers are the principal
135. See also Heitler, Antitrust and Third Party Insurers, 8 Am. J. L. & MED. 251 (1982).
136. The application of the Act's antitrust exemption becomes problematic in those situations
where the insuring function is split between the participating providers in a plan and the third-party
payor, or where the the risk is distributed among multiple providers, such as primary care physicians, specialists, and hospitals. See, eg., Ramsdell, Physician Reimbursementfor Services to HMOsponsored Patients, 23 MED. CARE REV. 1315 (1985) (describing capitation arrangement that divided risk for outpatient services between primary care physicians and specialty physicians). For
example, a capitated reimbursement scheme may be limited to those services that a participating
physician actually provides so that the risks associated with referrals to specialists and inpatient
hospitalization may be borne by the third-party payor. Consequently, the total risk for the care
provided under the plan is divided between the providers and the purchaser of health services.
Adding to the complexity, physicians frequently organize themselves as partnerships or professional corporations before participating in risk-based provider arrangements; the organization as a
whole contracts with the third-party payor so that the risk of financial loss is spread among its
members.
A single example of how the allocation of risk may influence the application of the Act is found in
Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan of Minnesota, 517 F. Supp. 564 (D. Minn. 1981). Hoffman involved
an antitrust action brought by a professional corporation against a nonprofit dental service plan, in
which 95 percent of the state's dentists were participating members. The defendant, Delta, served as
a third-party payor in purchasing dental services for its group subscribers. The plaintiff charged that
Delta's fee schedules favored its own participating dentists, resulting in a state-wide monopoly of
dentistry. The contracts between Delta and its participating dentists provided for a five percent
withholding of the dentist's fees. Though the court did not specify in any detail the terms of the
withholding provision, generally, this type of arrangement is created as a way to give health-care
providers an incentive to contain utilization of services. A percentage of the provider's chargesanywhere from five to twenty percent-are withheld by the third-party payor and placed in a reserve
account. See Powers, supra note 79, at 279, 292. The third-party payor then establishes certain
utilization targets, which the provider is expected not to exceed. The nature of the targets vary, but
typically include a fixed limit for the provider's expenditures in treating his assigned patients. If
actual costs exceed the target, then the reserve funds are used to offset the excess costs. Thus, the
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risk-spreaders in a health-delivery system, courts should not be quick to
dismiss the Act's application simply because physicians are "not traditionally considered" to be in the business of insurance.

Finally, on the topic of risk-spreading, we should note that the
Supreme Court's decision to deny the exemption in Royal Drug does not
preclude an application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to physicians
placed at financial risk. The "Pharmacy Agreement" at issue in Royal
Drug did not transfer financial risk from the defendant in that case, Blue
Shield, to the participating pharmacies. Under the agreements, Blue
Shield's policyholders paid the pharmacies a fixed $2.00 fee for the
purchase of prescription drugs; in turn, Blue Shield paid the pharmacies
the acquisition costs of the drugs. Consequently, the participating phar-

macies were assured a fixed profit for each prescription filled. Blue
Shield, on the other hand, retained the risk that total costs under the
program would exceed the premiums collected, which would occur if the
demand for prescription drugs exceeded the anticipated use of that benefit. This type of arrangement is clearly distinguishable from those reimphysicians are at risk for the percentage of the fees withheld. The court in Hoffman rejected an
application of the Act's antitrust exemption because the withhold provision had been discontinued,
but the court also relies on authority for an argument that a five percent withholding would not
suffice to trigger the Act's exemption, since the arrangement did not place the provider at sufficient
risk. 517 F. Supp. at 569 (relying on National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 479
F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
101 S. Ct. 2415 (1982) (provider agreement providing for ultimate reimbursement to providers if
funds available for full benefit payment did not result in risks falling on provider). See also Kartell v.
Blue Shield of Mass., 542 F. Supp. 782 (D. Mass. 1982) (agreements between participating physicians and medical insurance plan requiring participating physicians to carry some of risk was not
sufficient to establish that agreements were business of insurance).
Thus, the result in Hoffman is consistent with the proposition that the Act's exemption should
reside with the actual insurer and should not be granted to those parties that carry only a small
percentage of the total risk. Hoffman, however, does not help in resolving those cases where the risk
is more evenly divided among the parties or allocated among different types of providers. A possible
solution under the Act may be to grant the exemption to each party but only for those activities that
entail the spreading of risk. For example, if a capitation agreement encompasses only a physician's
own services, the exemption could be crafted so that similarly situated physicians who participate in
the same plan are able to engage in the sorts of collective activity envisioned by the Act, but only as
it pertains to services to be provided under that contract. The same physicians would not be permitted to engage in collective activity involving the provision of services under other non-risk based
arrangements.
Nor should the exemption be denied in those cases where physicians are organized into single
entities and thereby contract with third-party payors. Under these circumstances, the group of physicians becomes the insuring entity and is likely to provide medical care to a greater number of
patients, thereby increasing the risk that would otherwise fall on a single, independent practitioner.
The exchange of actuarial and underwriting information, as envisioned by the Act, would permit
physician groups to better assess the adequacy of reimbursement for their participation in such a
plan.
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bursement schemes in which physicians receive a fixed rate of
compensation while assuming the economic risk of providing comprehensive medical care to a group of patients.
2. The Insurance Contract. In addition to risk-spreading, the
Supreme Court in Royal Drug found a second, essential element of the
"business of insurance" within the contract between the insurer and its
policyholders:
The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which
could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement-these were
the core of the "business of insurance." Undoubtedly, other activities of
insurance companies relate so closely to their status as reliable insurers that
they too must be placed in the same class. But whatever the precise scope of
the statutory term, it is clear where the focus was-it was on
137 the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder.
The Court held that the pharmacy agreements in Royal Drug did not
satisfy this requirement because they involved separate contractual arrangements other than those between the insurer and its policyholders.
Alternatively, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the
agreements, because they influence the cost of insurance to policyholders,
had a sufficient impact on the insurance contract to fall within the Act's
exemption. 138 The Court reasoned that such an interpretation would
prove overly broad, since it would encompass every decision by an in139
surer intended to contain the premiums charged to its policyholders.
This conclusion would appear to preclude an application of the Act
to risk-based provider arrangements because, like the pharmacy agreements in Royal Drug, they entail the purchase of services by the insurer
with the goal to minimize costs. Moreover, any attempt to place the provider of services under the Act would not depend on the insurance contract between the purchaser of those services, such as an HMO, and its
subscribers. There are, however, several responses to the Court's analysis-some factual, some legal-all of which would accommodate the
Court's reasoning.
First, the transfer of economic risk from a third-party payor to the
provider places the physician among those "other activities" that "relate
so closely to [the insurer's] status as a reliable insurer" that they qualify
for exemption. Generally, in most risk-based provider arrangements, the
137.

440 U.S. at 215-16 (quoting SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 359 U.S. 453 (1972)).

138. Id.
139.

Id. at 216-17.
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physician is given substantial control and discretion over the extent of
care his patients will receive under the insurance contract. This is readily
apparent in the case of a physician who is placed in the role of a gatekeeper:
The gatekeeper is a designated health professional who serves as the patient's 'primary physician' and refers the patient to specialist services, as
needed, as a condition of third-party payment for such services. While capitation is an appropriate method of paying for the gatekeeper function, other
methods
are also acceptable, provided the rates are for a defined period of
time.' 40
Under such an arrangement, "physicians becomie both clinical and financial managers responsible for the total care of their patients."' 1 More
importantly, for the purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the effects
of the gate-keeper system on the patient are significant and arise directly
from the insurance contract. The system places substantial restraints on
the patient's freedom of choice in deciding when to see a specialist or
undergo inpatient hospitalization, since these decisions must be authorized by the primary care physician in order to be covered under the plan.
If the patient attempts to circumvent the system, he becomes liable for
the costs of any unauthorized services.' 4 2 In effect, the physician controls
the allocation of benefits under the insurance contract-a function that
would otherwise be performed by the traditional health insurance company through the claims review process. The patient is no longer reimbursed for the services received; instead, the patient receives his benefits
in the form of the services themselves, obtained directly from the physician, who rations the extent of care provided and oversees the patient's
well-being. Returning to the language of Royal Drug, the "reliability, interpretation, and enforcement" of the insurance contract 43are placed
largely, if not exclusively, within the physician's discretion.'
A second response to the Court's emphasis on the relationship between the insurer and the insured is found in TraverlersInsurance Coinpany v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania.'" In Travelers, a private
insurer brought an action against a non-profit hospitalization insurer,
140. Somers, And Who Shall be the Gatekeeper? The Role ofthe PrimaryPhysician in the Health
Care Delivery System, 20 INQUIRY 301, 303 (1983).
141. Id. at 311.
142. Id. at 306.
143. See Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n. v. Klamath Medical Service Bureau, 701 F.2d
1276 (9th Cir. 1983) (McCarran-Ferguson Act applicable where health care provider that offered
prescription drug benefit and supplemental pharmacy benefit settled distribution of risk that insurers
would need medical goods and services).
144. 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973).
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charging the latter with a restraint of trade in connection with its contracts for reimbursing hospitals.a 5 Despite the fact that the case involved
the contractual relationship between the insurer and its providers, as opposed to its policyholders, the court of appeals held that "the interrelationship of hospital payments and subscribers' rates was such that Blue
Cross's arrangement with hospitals should be considered part of the
'business of insurance.' """ This conclusion is based, in part, on the financial impact that the hospital contracts had on the premiums paid by
Blue Shield's policyholders. 4 7 An additional factor, having to do with
the state's regulation of the relationship between Blue Shield and the hospitals, is discussed below. 4 ' Thus, Travelers seems to indicate that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act has a valid application in those cases where the
challenged antitrust activity arises from the relationship between the insurer and its providers and where the same relationship substantially influences the premiums paid by policyholders."4 In the case of physicians
placed at financial risk, the fees paid to service providers will significantly
influence the premium rates that are passed on to subscribers through a
third-party payor, since a substantial portion of the premium is devoted
to compensating providers. 150 Consequently, Travelers lends further support to the argument that risk-based provider arrangements belong to the
business of insurance.
3. PrepaidHealth Care Versus Indemnity Health Insurers. Apart
from risk-spreading and the insurance contract, the Court discerned a
third and final attribute belonging to the "business of insurance" having
to do with the Act's application to prepaid health-care organizations as
145. The plaintiff objected to a standard contract that Blue Cross had with 101 hospitals in the
area, prescribing the amounts and terms under which it would pay for services rendered by its
subscribers.
146. 481 F.2d at 83. Importantly, the court in Travelers relies on precisely the same language
from SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 359 U.S. 453 (1972), that the Supreme Court used in Royal
Drug. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
147. A witness in the Travelers case made the following observation regarding the financial
impact of the provider contracts on the policyholders' premiums: "[Tihese two things are really
indivisible aspects reflecting the same economic forces. If you do not have a sound contract between
Blue Cross and the hospitals that controls costs and quality then the Blue Cross rate to the subscriber is going to be unreasonable." 481 F.2d at 83.
148. See infra Section IVC.
149. It is not clear to what extent Travelers is still valid in light of the Supreme Court's holding
in Royal Drug that the business of insurance did not extend to contracts between an insurer and its
providers.
150. See D. MACKIE & D. DECKER, supra note 104, at 129-134 (actuarial method of determining premium based on average utilization per service per month multiplied by average cost of
service).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

opposed to indemnity health insurers. 15 1
The distinction between prepaid health care plans and traditional
indemnity insurance rests primarily on two features: (1) the budgeting
technique used to satisfy claims or subsidize health-care costs, and (2)
the relationship between the insuring entity and the providers of health
care. Indemnity insurers are generally divorced from the actual delivery
of health care; the payment of claims is made directly to the patient as
opposed to the provider. 152 In contrast, prepaid plans, such as Blue Cross
and Blue Shield, reimburse providers directly and frequently have some
form of contractual relationship with physicians and hospitals. 15 3 More
significant to an application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is the difference in financing mechanisms between the two. Insurance can be described as a "device for accumulating funds to meet losses through the
transfer of individual risks to a large number of persons." 154 Insurance is
probabilistic in nature and operates on the law of large numbers. Though
the "fortuitous needs of a particular individual cannot be predicted accurately, the needs of a large group can."' 1 55 The financing of health-care
costs under a prepaid plan, in contrast, can be seen as a "forced savings
plan."1 6 Subscribers make payments to the plan in return for a fixed
bundle of medical services, the cost for which is spread out over time
157
prior to the use of such services.
In Royal Drug, the Court relied on the distinction between indemnity insurance and prepaid health plans for its argument that the pharmacy agreements in question did not qualify for the Act's antitrust
exemption. The Court's distinction, however, was based primarily on a
different set of factors than the two discussed above. Specifically, it relied
on: (1) the absence of state insurance regulation over prepaid health service plans at the time of the Act's passage; 15 8 (2) legislative history showing that Congress did not intend the "business of insurance" to be
broader than its commonly understood meaning;1 59 (3) judicial precedent
from 1939 to the effect that such plans are concerned primarily with the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

440 U.S. at 226.
A. EASTON, supra note 6, at 23.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10-11.
Feigenbaum, supra note 102, at 122.
Id.
440 U.S. at 226.
Id. at 230.
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provision of medical services and not with risk-spreading; 160 (4) efforts
by Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations to escape state insurance
regulation; 161 and (5) the exclusion by state insurance codes of such plans
from the business of insurance at the time of the Act's passage.' 6 2 This
argument has important implications for our own discussion, since riskbased delivery systems are generally classified as a type of prepaid health
63
care plan.1
The Court's argument and all of its attendant support, failed to acknowledge the recent steps taken by state legislatures to bring prepaid
health plans within the scope of insurance regulation.' 64 Consequently,
the Court ignored the broader purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to
preserve state control over the insurance industry. As the legislative history clearly indicates and as the Supreme Court conceded, "The primary
concern of Congress in the wake of [the S.E.U.A.] decision was in enacting legislation that would ensure that the states would continue to have
the ability to tax and regulate the business of insurance."' 16 The Court's
historical emphasis on the fact that prepaid health plans were not regulated at the time of the Act's passage was surely misplaced. It is hard to
believe that Congress did not anticipate the possible expansion or contraction of state regulatory control over the insurance industry as it
evolved. In fact, the legislative history clearly reflects the contrary expectation. 166 The Court's rather firm conclusion that prepaid plans do not
belong to the "business of insurance" has the effect of diminishing state
authority under the Act as the exemption itself is narrowed. Thus, the
Court threatens to disturb the balance between state and federal interests
that the Act was intended to achieve and sustain over time.
Lower courts, in fact, have already refused to accept the conclusion
that the Act does not have any force in those cases involving prepaid
health plans that provide insurance for their subscribers as well as the
services for which the subscriber has paid. 167 Such a rule is consistent
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 220.
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 230 n.38.
See A. EASTON, supra note 6, at 38.

164. See infra Section IV(C.
165. 440 U.S. at 217-18.
166. In explaining the overall purpose of the Act, Senator Ferguson's language clearly indicates
that the states were expected to modify their control over the insurance industry, and that the Act
would accommodate such changes: "We believe that there is some wisdom left in the legislatures of
the various states, and that they should exercise their judgment and regulate insurance, except in the
respects which we have enumerated." 91 CONG. REc. 1481 (1945).
167. See, eg., Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Service Bureau, 701
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with the reality that prepaid plans, including HMOs,' 68 do engage in
some form of risk-spreading though the use of a community rating system. Under such a system, subscribers are charged a uniform "commu69
nity" premium irrespective of their actual use of medical services.'
Because all subscribers are charged the same rates regardless of risk,
poor risks are subsidized by good risks. 170 Moreover, it is only when a
subscriber can precisely predict his actual future medical costs that he
has engaged strictly in a prepayment plan for future medical services, by
paying a premium roughly equal to the cost of future treatment. 71 When
a subscriber cannot predict future costs, which is typically the case, he in
t72
fact purchases insurance against the risk of requiring medical services,
whether the insuring entity is an indemnity insurer, a prepaid health
plan, or an HMO. Thus, the distinction between indemnity insurers and
prepaid health plans is not as clear as the Court would like to believe.
For purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the distinction should not
preclude an application of the Act to providers placed at financial risk.
4. Summary. Physicians or health-care providers in general who
insure the costs of medical treatment in conjunction with their medical
practice are engaged in the "business of insurance" as defined by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. These providers participate in the risk-spreading
activity that traditionally has belonged to the indemnity insurer or the
prepaid health plan. Moreover, the physician's discretion over what benefits are actually received by the patient under such a plan, combined
with the financial impact that the physician has on the subscriber's premiums, gives the physician an integral role in shaping, enforcing, and
regulating the insurance contract.
C. State Regulation
The second element under the McCarran-Ferguson Act requires
that the challenged activity be regulated by the state. As explained
above,' 7 3 this provision of the statute is intended to preserve state regulaF.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding McCarran-Ferguson exemption in context of Blue Shield pharmacy benefit provided by insurer).
168. Federal qualification under the HMO Act calls for rates based on the community rating
system. 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1982).
169. Fegenbaum, supra note 102, at 134.
170. A. EASTON, supra note 6, at 23.
171. Feigenbaum, supra note 102, at 123.
172. Id.
173. Supra notes 87, 91-93 and accompanying text.
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tory authority over the insurance industry.
The applicable test for this element of the Act is succinctly expressed in California League of Independent Insurance Producers v.
Aetna CasualtySurety Company: "[I]f a state has generally authorized or
permitted certain standards of conduct, it is regulating the business of
insurance."' 7 4 In CaliforniaLeague, the plaintiffs were insurance agents
who accused various insurance companies of fixing commission rates.
Though the state statute prohibited insurance companies from agreeing
on rates, the court nevertheless held that the regulation requirement
under the Act was satisfied. Thus, actual compliance with state law is not
required.
Other courts have gone so far as to state that "the fact that no statute specifically deals with the practice here in question is irrelevant" to
the issue of state regulation. 75 Alternatively, if a controlling statute or
regulation does exist, the availability of exemption "is not affected by...
whether or not the state enforces its regulations or whether such enforcement is effective." 176 Consequently, even remote and imprecise regula177
tion of an activity may satisfy this element of the Act.
State regulation of prepaid health service plans is likely to satisfy
these requirements in the case of risk-based provider agreements. For
17 8
example, California's Knox-Keene Health Care. Service Plan Act,
though it does not belong to California's insurance law, provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme intended to protect the interests of both
consumers and health-care providers who participate in various health
service plans. 179 The Act's broad definition of a health service plan brings
within its scope those organizations that arrange for the provision of
health services to their subscribers in return for a prepaid fee. 180 The
organizations that fall within the Act are likely to include those that em174.
175.

175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1976).

176. Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 26, 30 (D.D.C. 1975).
177. But see Weller, supra note 80, at 607-18 (legislative history suggests that Act requires specific state regulatory authority over activity in question).
178. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1340-1399.64 (West Supp. 1988). See also N.Y. INS.
LAW § 4301-4315 (McKinney Supp. 1988). This article of New York's insurance law provides an
extensive regulatory scheme applicable to prepaid health plans, which generally offer capitation arrangements with independent providers.
179. See generally Tom, Perspectives on Regulationsunder the Knox-Keene Health Care Service
Plan Act, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 433 (1985).
180. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1345 (West Supp. 1988) states: "'Health care service
plan' means any person who undertakes to arrange for the provision of health care services to subscribers or enrollees, or to pay for or to reimburse any part of the cost for such services, in return for
a prepaid or periodic charge paid by or on behalf of such subscribers or enrollees."
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ploy independent physicians or other health-care providers on a contractual basis. Generally, risk-based provider agreements, because they rely
on a third party serving as a broker for health services between the subscriber and the physician, are likely to fall within the variety of regulations belonging to the act at least for purposes of satisfying the state
regulation requirement of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 8 ' Moreover,
courts already have acknowledged that the Knox-Keene legislation satis1 82
fies the requirement for state regulation under the Act.
Existing state insurance law may also regulate the contractual relationship between the third-party purchaser of health services and the
provider. California's insurance law, for example, provides that comprehensive health care programs "may, subject to the approval of the commissioner . . . [e]nter into agreements with individual physicians or
groups thereof for the rendering of services to subscribers ...or such a
program on a fee-for-service or prepaid capitation basis."1'83 This type of
express statutory regulation would likely satisfy the requirements for
state oversight under the Act.
Frequently, enabling legislation for prepaid health plans, such as
HMOs, also provides a source for state regulation. For example, in New
York, the state's Health Maintenance Act governs the financial aspects
of provider contracts. 8 4
Where these types of statutory schemes are available, the requirements for state regulation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act would
likely be satisfied.
D. Boycott, Coercion, or Intimidation
The third and final element of the McCarran-Ferguson Act disallows an exemption for anticompetitive activity under the Act for any
agreement to or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.18 5 This element
of the legislation is intended to preserve the application of federal antitrust law in those instances where the challenged activity goes beyond the
181. See supra note 114.
182. See Manasen v. California Dental Services, 424 F. Supp. 657 (1976), rev'don other grounds,
638 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1979).
183. CAL. INS. CODE § 11493.2 (West Supp. 1988).
184. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4402 (McKinney Supp. 1988), which requires that
the Commissioner of Public Health will not issue a certificate of authority to establish an HMO
unless the applicant demonstrates that the "prepayment mechanism of its comprehensive health care
services plan, the bases upon providers are compensated ... is conducive to the use of ambulatory
care and the efficient use of hospital services."
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1982).
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types of cooperative conduct envisioned by the Act. Though the statute is
designed to acknowledge the exclusive role of state insurance regulation,
the exemption from antitrust scrutiny will not extend to those who commit egregious violations of federal antitrust law. To achieve this compromise, the Act excludes from its antitrust exemption certain statutorily
defined types of anticompetitive conduct, which federal courts have
struggled to interpret consistently.
The Supreme Court, in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
Barry, 186 held that the restriction on the types of collective activity permitted under the Act is intended to evoke the body of judicial decisions
interpreting the Sherman Act. 187 With the Sherman Act in mind, the
Court provided the general rule that "the generic concept of boycott refers to a method of pressuring a party with whom one has a dispute by
withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, patronage or services from
the target." 188 Responding to a dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart, in
which the majority is accused of broadening the notion of "boycott" beyond its intended scope, the Court added to this definition an important
qualification:
Whatever the precise reach of the terins "boycott," "coercion," and "intimidation," the decisions of this Court do not support the dissent's suggestion
that they are coextensive with the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. In this
regard, we are not citing to any decision illustrating the assertion that pricefixing, in the absence of any additional
'1 8 9 enforcement activity, has been
treated as a "boycott" or "coercion."
This suggests that price-fixing among competitors is permissible under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act provided that the participants do not combine their collective actions with some type of "enforcement activity"
that would compel others to abide by the terms of their own accord.
Applying this standard to the facts in Barry, an agreement among three
insurers not to insure the customers of a forth insurer was held to constitute a boycott. The Court explained:
St. Paul induced its competitors to refuse to deal on any terms with its
customers. This arrangement did not simply fix rates or terms of coverage;
it effectively barred St. Paul's policyholders from all access to alternative
sources of coverage and even from negotiating for more favorable terms
elsewhere in the market. 190
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

438 U.S. 531 (1978).
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id. at 545 n.18.
Id. at 544.

824
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The Court's emphasis on the defendant's refusal to deal on any terms
suggests that a refusal to deal on certain, specified terms may be permissible conduct under the Act. As one commentator has observed, the Court
sets forth contradictory signals as to what constitutes a boycott for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act: "The fact that there was an absolute refusal to deal was repeatedly emphasized by the Barry Court....
However, the Court at the same time hinted that conduct not involving
an absolute refusal to deal, such as a price fixing agreement involving
enforcement activity, may fall within the 'boycott' term."''
Lower courts relying on Barry have picked up this apparent distinction between a concerted refusal to deal on any terms and a concerted
refusal to deal on certain, specified terms. 192 A recent example involving
the health-care industry is Feinstein v. Nettleship Company of Los Angeles.'9 3 In Feinstein, plaintiff physicians brought an antitrust action
against a county medical association and the medical malpractice insurer
that had issued a master policy to the association. Physicians who
wanted to take advantage of the insurance offered through the association were required to become members. The plaintiffs alleged that the
arrangement involved a conspiracy to monopolize, tied sales, and a boy191. Coughlin, Losing McCarranAct Protection Through "Boycott, Coercion, or Intimidation,"
54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1281, 1206 (1985).
Importantly, the Court in Barry did not decide whether state regulation of a particular activity is
a factor in determining its legality under the Act:
[W]hile we give force to the congressional intent to preserve Sherman Act review for
certain types of private collaborative activity by insurance companies, we do not hold
that all concerted activity violative of the Sherman Act comes within § 3(b) [which contains the boycott exception]. Nor does our decision address insurance practices that are
compelled or specifically authorized by state regulatory policy.
438 U.S. at 555. Thus, it remains unclear whether the presence of express regulatory authority over a
challenged activity will affect the availability of the exemption under the Act. This may become an
issue where there exits a direct conflict between state regulation and those type of collective conduct
that are prohibited under the Act. See Coughlin, supra, at 1285. Because risk-based provider arrangements may be closely regulated by state insurance or public health law, this issue may bear
importantly on the possible application of the Act, where in fact such a conflict in the law exists,
192. In California League of Indep. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 179 F.
Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959), the court rejected the distinction between an absolute refusal to deal and
a refusal to deal except on certain terms, arguing that the Act's plain meaning did not support the
distinction. The court conceded, however, that such a rule renders the Act's exemption meaningless,
since a party that complies with the Act's remaining elements does not have the capacity to enforce a
collective agreement by refusing to accept from a purchaser any terms other than those offered. Id.
at 66; see also Coughlin, supra note 191 at 128.
193. 714 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath
Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1983) (requirement by nonprofit provider of health
insurance and health care services that insureds' use of provider's pharmacy did not constitute
boycott).
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cott. The court of appeals, however, held that the defendant's conduct
fell within the antitrust exemption. On the issue of whether or not a boycott existed, the court held that because the plaintiffs were free to
purchase insurance from other carriers, the defendant's conduct did not
amount to a "boycott, coercion, or intimidation" under the Act.
In sum, the defendants had not engaged in an absolute boycott of
the plaintiffs, but refused to deal with them except on certain terms;
namely, that they become members of the association in order to participate in the insurance plan. Moreover, members of the association were
not compelled to purchase through the association. The court further
held that plaintiffs could not assert a section two monopolization claim
unless they were able to show some additional act or agreement amounting to boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
Cases such as Feinstein, however, do not resolve whether cooperative pricing activity combined with a refusal to deal on specific terms
would fall under the Act's boycott exception. This is a crucial issue for
our discussion, since a group of independent physicians, assuming they
satisfied the remaining elements of the Act, would likely seek to engage
in some form of cooperative pricing activity as a means to protect or
assert their economic interests. Though the exchange and collective use
of pricing information is permitted under the Act,' 94 and although such
activities may certainly be valuable to physicians placed at financial risk,
the ability to engage in some form of concerted refusal to deal would
make it possible to carry out a cooperative pricing policy.
The available case law suggests that entities possessing substantial
market power will not be allowed to engage in price-fixing activity despite their compliance with the remaining provisions of the Act. In re
Worker's Compensation Litigation,195 for example, involved a price-fixing
action brought against underwriters of worker's compensation insurance
and the state worker's compensation insurance rating association. The
plaintiff employers alleged that the defendants had entered into a cooperative agreement not to charge less than the maximum lawful rate set by
the state's insurance commissioner. Though the court of appeals acknowledged that "mere price fixing, i.e., a refusal to deal except at a
specified price, without more, is not within the confines of the term boycott,', 196 it reversed the defendant's summary judgment below on
grounds that the record contained certain enforcement activity that may
194. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
195. 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH). 68, 432 (8th Cir. 1989).
196. Id.
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bring the defendant within the boycott exception. Among other things,
this conduct included acts of intimidation to maintain uniform rates by
all worker's compensation carriers and exclusionary practices that prevented non-members of the association from underwriting insurance.
The question remains what constitutes "mere price fixing" of the
type described in the above case. Perhaps the best clue is found in cases
such as Feinstein, which rely on a plaintiff's ability to deal freely with
third parties despite the defendant's exclusionary conduct. The difference
between Feinstein and In re Worker's Compensation Litigation rests primarily on the defendant's conduct in the latter case to coerce and intimidate other insurance carriers in order to ensure their participation in the
defendant's price-fixing arrangement. This, coupled with the threat of expulsion for failure to comply with established pricing policies, would
largely eliminate an employer's opportunity to deal freely with carriers
who refused to belong to the association.
This type of coercive and exclusionary conduct is not present in circumstances in which a cooperative association does not possess monopoly or near monopoly power and does not coerce members to join its
ranks.' 97 For example, an association of providers that possess monopoly
power could not engage in a permissible boycott, since a purchaser of
such services is left without recourse to other market participants. 19 If
the providers' conduct, however, does not foreclose access to the remaining market, then a purchaser of services retains the opportunity to deal
with those providers who have chosen not to participate in concerted
activity. Moreover, the association of providers cannot engage in conduct
intended to coerce non-members into joining, since such conduct
amounts to a coercive boycott of the type found in Barry and is intended
to eliminate that portion of the market to which a purchaser would turn
if it chose not to deal with the association.
If in fact, this is the proper understanding of "mere price-fixing," as
opposed to an impermissible boycott, the result is consistent with the
proposal that a price-fixing agreement without substantial market power
197. Though a price-fixing agreement may have some anticompetitive effects despite a lack of
market power, the boycott exceptions under the McCarran-Ferguson Act are not coextensive with
prohibitions of the Sherman Act. Barry, 430 U.S. at 545. Consequently, what is impermissible collective activity under the antitrust laws may be permissible under the Act.
198. The rating bureau cases, see, e.g. supranote 129, in which courts have condoned concented
price-fixing by numerous insurers provides some support for the conclusion that market power is
irrelevant in defining a boycott under the Act. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the possession and use of market power in the context of a conditional boycott is a determining factor for the
type of "enforcement activity" intended by the Supreme Court in Barry.
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may have a limited anticompetitive effect, or perhaps no effect at all. 199
Conversely, physicians who seek to engage in "mere price fixing" may
discover that their concerted activity has little economic force, since a
purchaser of health-services will have access to the unassociated portion
of the market. Nevertheless, an association of physicians that complies
with the dictates of the McCarran-Ferguson Act may still find some
practical value in being able to engage in cooperative rate-making activity similar to that practiced by indemnity insurers, since doing so will
provide access to a larger body of actuarial data, which, in turn, may
provide for more accurate underwriting of the economic risks that providers face." °
V.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON
EXEMPTION AS APPLIED TO PROVIDERS

Beyond the formal elements of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, there
lies the broader policy issues that may ultimately determine the scope of
its application in the health-care context. The emerging emphasis in the
health-care industry on the efficient and cost-effective use of services is
taking place in response to the rapid escalation of health-care costs in the
United States.2 ' In light of the present, competitive atmosphere that surrounds the health-care industry, it may seem contrary to public policy to
suggest that physicians and other health-care providers should be given
even a limited exemption from federal antitrust legislation. In response to
this legitimate concern, I offer the following tentative response.
To begin with, it bears repeating that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not provide a blanket exemption from the antitrust laws. As discussed above, a party engaged in the "business of insurance" cannot resort to concerted "boycott, coercion, or intimidation" in order to win
concessions in the bargaining process. The Act is designed to permit collective activity among competitors but only to the extent of formulating
contract terms to be negotiated and enforced on a relatively independent
basis.
The Act's intended restrictions on concerted conduct, however, may
199. See H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, 84 (1985); Id. at n.2;
cf R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 268-69 (1978).
200. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
201. In 1987, national health care expenditures topped $500 billion, an increase of 9.8 percent
from 1986. Letsch, Levit & Waldo, NationalHealth Expenditures, 1987, 10 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 109 (Winter 1988). National health care expenditures, as a share of gross national product,

increased to 11.1 percent in 1987, up from 10.7 percent in 1986, and nearly double what it was in
1965. Id.
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not have prevented anticompetitive effects in the insurance industry,
since collusive boycotts may go undetected. As one commentator has observed, "Finding a 'smoking gun' agreement not to underwrite insurance
...is rather unusual." 20 2 The industry's reliance on joint rate bureaus,
which promulgate "advisory" rates, makes it possible to engage in collusive conduct without recourse to express and concerted refusals to
deal.2" 3 Without a smoking gun, "courts have been forced to dismiss
cases involving either price fixing or any other type of collusion falling
2 °4 While the same
short of a complete refusal to deal on any terms.""
conscious parallelism may occur between health-care providers if allowed to engage in joint pricing activity under the Act, the potential anticompetitive effects of the Act should be weighed against other factors
that militate in favor of the Act's application to health-care providers.
First, in defense of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, representatives of
the insurance industry, as well as the Justice Department, have suggested
that the Act has helped to create an unconcentrated insurance industry
with low entry barriers.2 0 5 The lack of concentration, in turn, makes it
extremely difficult to enforce uniform rates, since many firms have a
strong incentive to undercut inflated bureau rates in order to attract a
larger market share.20 6 Arguably, one could expect the same result
among health-care providers, despite concerted pricing activity. The ability to collect and process pricing information on a cooperative basis may
reduce the need for providers to organize themselves into larger entities,
and the resulting unconcentrated market would make it difficult to engage in a successful price fixing arrangement.
Finally, there is also the concern that physicians are frequently
placed in a position of diminished bargaining strength because they lack
the resources and expertise necessary to evaluate the reimbursement rates
proposed by a third-party payor. 20 7 This disparity in bargaining power
202. Angoff, supra note 123, at 403
203. Id. at 403-404.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Current Crisis in Liability Insurance: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1986) (testimony of George K. Bernstein); Insurance Competition Improvement Act, S.2474: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights of
the Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1980) (testimony of Andre Maigonplerre).
206. Insurance Competition Act, S.2474: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust Monopoly, and Business Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1980) (statement of the Alliance of American Insurers).
207. An observer to the bargaining process between providers and third-party payors has described what sometimes takes place: "Too frequently, the brute force negotiating approach is used,
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may be reduced if providers are allowed to pool resources and data, without the threat of antitrust liability, in order to establish adequate levels of
compensation for their services. The McCarran-Ferguson Act would
provide the vehicle to accomplish this end.
FRANK

T. HERDMAN

Under this approach, the plan makes an offer and providers must accept or reject it without adequate documentation or explanation." Axene & Mulet, Negotiating Provider Contracts Actuaral
Style, in NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS HMO's & BEYOND 353 (Group Health Institute 1986). The
same observer lends some insight as to why health service plans are able to resort to such a forceful
approach:
Idealistically, providers might be expected to accept the utilization and reimbursement
levels developed by the plan. Realistically, providers frequently do not agree with the
managed care utilization levels used by the plan. Providers are at a decided disadvantage
in making their assessments. Providers see only the user side of health care. They usually
lack adequate data to convert it into utilization rates for an average covered member.
Id. at 354.

